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Regulation vs. Litigation:  Introduction 
 
Modern capitalist societies take two approaches to controlling market failures.  One 
approach relies on relatively specific rules developed and enforced by administrative 
agencies.  In this approach, bureaucrats with technical expertise monitor private parties to 
ensure compliance.  The bureaucrats operate in a larger framework that requires advance 
notice of and opportunities to comment on any rule changes.  In addition, the bureaucrats 
are subject to political oversight by the executive and/or legislative branches, which limit 
(for better or worse) the scope of what they can do.  This constellation of characteristics 
defines what is often described as "regulation." 
 
Another approach relies on broad standards that are enforced by courts.  In this approach, 
private parties may contract with one another about their rights and responsibilities; when 
parties fail to contract, either because their interaction is inadvertent, or because the costs 
of contracting are too great relative to the benefits, the courts apportion rights and 
responsibilities between them.  The courts are staffed by judges -- a generalist lawyers 
who may or may not have expertise in the subject matter underlying the parties' dispute.  
The judges are sometimes answerable to voters, but often appointed for life and 
answerable to no one.  The courts' decisions are not subject to notice requirements, but 
can be appealed to another court.  This constellation of characteristics defines what is 
described as "litigation." 
 
The purpose of this volume is to explore the tradeoffs between these two approaches.  In 
particular, the papers will seek to determine the circumstances in which one approach 
dominates the other; to identify general principles that should guide assignment of 
activities to regulation- versus litigation-based systems of social control; and to 
investigate which aspects of regulation- and litigation-based systems work well or poorly 
in practice. 
 
Previous research on regulation versus litigation 
The study of regulation and litigation has a long history in law and economics, starting 
with Ronald Coase's (1960) provocative hypothesis that many types of externalities could 
be controlled by contract, with the remainder handled by tort law.  In Coase's world, 
informational difficulties and transaction costs are minimal, and disputes (when they 
arose) would be subject to adjudication by the courts.  As Andrei Shleifer points out in 
his contribution to this volume, this position is consistent with the broader Chicago 
School suspicion of regulation as an efficient mechanism.   
 
Subsequent work focused on situations that differed from Coase's ideal.  This work 
highlighted the various factors that determined whether regulation or litigation would be 
preferred from the perspective of social welfare, depending on which of Coase's 
assumptions failed to hold.  Although largely in the theoretical law-and-economics 
tradition, this growing literature painted a considerably more nuanced picture than did 
Coase.  Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner (1974) focused on the tradeoffs between rules, 
which were traditionally enforced through regulation, and (more general) standards, 
which were traditionally enforced through litigation.  Donald Wittman (1977) observed that litigation -- which is based on enforcement that takes place after an injury or 
violation occurs -- could be less attractive than regulation when monitoring and assigning 
responsibility for injuries was more costly than monitoring levels of precaution.  Steven 
Shavell (1984a) proposed a more general framework that balanced the influence of 
several factors, including informational advantages of a public enforcer, diffuseness of 
injured parties, limited ability to impose liability on injurers, and high administrative 
costs of courts. 
 
The liability insurance crises of the 1980s stimulated a wave of empirical research that 
sought to evaluate regulation versus litigation in the real world.  In a comprehensive 
review of both the theoretical and empirical literature, Don Dewees, David Duff, and 
Michael Trebilcock (1996) systematically compared the performance of litigation and 
regulation in terms of the systems' compensation and deterrence goals.  Robert Litan and 
Cliff Winston (1988) examined litigation's deterrent effects in the realms of 
environmental pollution, occupational accidents, and design and production of defective 
consumer products.  Peter Huber and Robert Litan (1991) reported the results of a series 
of case studies that compared the performance of regulation and litigation in industries 
such as aviation, pharmaceuticals, auto manufacturing, and chemicals.   
 
Most (although not all) of these empirical studies questioned the efficacy of litigation.  
Several cited the unpredictability of the United States' decentralized system of state 
courts to explain why signals from the tort system often failed to translate into increases 
in safety.  In fact, some claimed that the liability system actually had adverse effects on 
safety, particularly for long-lived durable goods.  Graham (1991), for example, argued 
that the possibility that courts would interpret design improvements as an admission that 
a prior design was defective creates a disincentive for safety-enhancing innovation.  
Others focused on the deadweight burden from the substantial administrative costs 
imposed by the adversarial nature of the civil justice system.   As summarized by Huber 
and Litan (1991, p. 15), "the documented direct linkages between liability and safety thus 
far are weak.  In most of the sectors examined, other factors -- primarily regulation and 
bad publicity -- seem in the aggregate to provide much more important incentives to 
providers to improve the safety of products and services." 
 
However, the failures of litigation were most striking in markets for health services.  Paul 
Weiler and coauthors (1993) reported the results of the landmark Harvard Medical 
Practice Study, which analyzed the medical records of a random sample of 30,000 
patients hospitalized in New York in 1984.  They found that the sensitivity and 
specificity of the liability system were quite poor:  only one in 15 patients who suffered 
an injury due to medical negligence received compensation, and five-sixths of the cases 
that received compensation showed no evidence of negligence.  Daniel Kessler and Mark 
McClellan (1996) found that these incentives translated into "defensive medicine" -- use 
of precautionary treatments with minimal expected medical benefit out of fear of legal 
liability.  In particular, in a population of elderly Medicare beneficiaries with cardiac 
illness, they found that direct liability reforms such as caps on damages reduced health 
spending, but had no effect on patient health outcomes.    
 The 1990s brought a new phenomenon:  the use of litigation to impose regulation.  In this 
scenario, executive-branch agencies or even private parties sue alleged wrongdoers and 
obtain settlements that govern the defendant's future behavior through a system of highly 
specific rules.  The potential importance of the overlap between regulation and litigation 
was not a new issue.  Although regulatory compliance was not a universal defense to 
negligence, it was in some cases admissible in tort as evidence.  In addition, regulation 
and litigation were often viewed as substitutes, with optimal regimes containing some of 
each, depending on the two mechanisms' relative costs (Shavell (1984b)).    
 
However, the use of litigation as a means to force companies to accept regulation outside 
of the normal political process raised several new questions about litigation's dynamic 
costs and benefits (W. Kip Viscusi 2002; Andrew Moriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew 
Dorchak 2009).  On one hand, to the extent that litigation-inspired regulation addressed 
risks that, because of political market failures, were unacknowledged, then it might 
improve welfare.  On the other hand, to the extent that litigation-inspired regulation 
allowed attorneys general to usurp the authority of the legislature, or allowed the 
plaintiffs' bar to extort funds from business to be shared with government officials, then it 
might reduce welfare.   
 
The current volume  
The current volume is a collection of eleven papers, three of which are theoretical and 
eight of which are empirical.  Although the three theoretical papers offer distinct 
perspectives on how the tradeoffs between regulation and litigation should be understood, 
they share some common themes.  They agree in broad terms on the sorts of 
characteristics that determine whether a system should be viewed as regulation- or 
litigation-based.  In addition, they agree that the two methods of social control are best 
viewed as the extremes of a continuum.   
 
The taxonomy that Richard Posner proposes in his contribution makes this point clear.  
According to him, a regime can be characterized in four dimensions:  the extent to which 
it relies on ex ante versus ex post metrics; on rules versus standards; on experts versus 
generalists for design and implementation; and on public versus private means of 
enforcement.  In practice, every regime will somewhere in the middle on each dimension.  
Litigation-based systems often have regulatory qualities, and vice versa; regulatory 
agencies often have provisions for court-like hearings when the agency's interpretation of 
rule is disputed; and courts bind themselves with rules, such as the judge-made rule 
entitling criminal suspects to a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest.   
 
Andrei Shleifer argues that Posner's four dimensions can be collapsed into one:  the 
extent to which courts function well or poorly.  By putting the focus on courts, Shleifer's 
paper is very much part of the Coasean tradition, while at the same time highly critical of 
its sometimes unrealistic assumptions.  He makes the point that regulation is ubiquitous 
in modern societies because courts fail.  His analysis, however, extends beyond the usual 
enumeration of the magnitudes of the burdens imposed by transaction costs and imperfect 
information.  He also proposes a political economy model that links the rise of the 
regulatory state to income inequality -- and explains how this rise may be efficient.  When enforcement is mostly private, the side with greater resources is likely to have a 
substantial advantage in court.  This advantage may not only exacerbate the preexisting 
inequality, but also lead to a biased standard of care that reduces (distribution-neutral) 
social welfare.  
 
Fredrick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser explore a specific failure of litigation:  its 
dependence on particular cases.  They argue that making policy on the basis of cases is 
problematic because aberrational, rather than representative, cases tend to be the subject 
of lawsuits.  The fact that litigated cases are non-representative is well known (e.g., 
George Priest and Bernard Klein 1984).  However, as Schauer and Zeckhauser point out, 
failures of rationality (or, in Coasean terms, costs of information) may nonetheless 
preclude parties from correctly translating non-representative case outcomes into decision 
rules to govern behavior in ordinary situations.  More importantly, the cognitive 
availability of unrepresentative cases may lead judges to focus on the wrong issues; rules 
will be made to deal with the wrong events in the world.  And although this is a particular 
problem with litigation, they observe as well that many legislatively or administratively 
created rules and regulations, such as Megan’s Law and the Brady Bill, are also spurred 
by unusual cases, and thus often suffer from their case-inspired origins.    
 
The eight empirical papers include case studies in public health, financial markets, 
medical care, and workplace safety.   However, these papers have broader implications 
beyond the particular cases they examine.   
 
The two papers in public health deal with tobacco and guns.  Joni Hersch and W. Kip 
Viscusi provide an assessment of the consequences of the tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement (MSA), which took effect a bit over a decade ago.  State attorneys general 
and tobacco companies entered into the MSA to resolve a series of lawsuits in which the 
states sought to recoup their cigarette-related Medicaid costs.  The MSA imposed 
numerous regulatory requirements as well as financial payments from the cigarette 
manufacturers to the states.  Unlike damages payments in most tort cases, the MSA 
payments were based on future sales, not past behavior; this had the effect of making the 
payments economically equivalent to an excise tax, and shifting their burden from 
tobacco-company shareholders to future smokers.  This payment structure had the ironic 
effect of increasing states' dependence on future tobacco sales for their revenues, even as 
they had sued cigarette manufacturers over the dangers of smoking.   
 
The tax and regulatory components of the MSA also may have potential anti-competitive 
effects.  The MSA’s restrictions on cigarette advertising have led to a plummeting of 
advertising expenditures, which may impede new entry into the market and the 
introduction of new products.  Likewise, there may be anti-competitive effects arising 
from the requirement that new entrants are subject to the MSA payments despite having 
no past wrongful conduct.  Potential new entrants were not represented in the 
negotiations that led to the MSA.  Although Viscusi has written extensively on political 
and economic consequences of the MSA, his contribution with Hersch is more 
comprehensive in scope and provides the most up-to-date examination of the agreement that exists, including an analysis of the recently-passed Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act.   
 
Philip Cook, Jens Ludwig, and Adam Samaha evaluate the likely effects of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in D.C v. Heller, 118 S.Ct 2783 (2008).  In that decision, the 
Court struck down the District of Columbia's handgun ban, recognizing for the first time 
an individual constitutional right to own a gun.  While the immediate effect of the 
opinion is to invalidate an unusually stringent regulation in a city that is also an enclave 
of the federal government, the reach of the decision is not yet clearly defined.  Cook, 
Ludwig, and Samaha predict that the decision will ultimately increase the prevalence of 
handguns in jurisdictions that currently have restrictive laws, and as a result, increase the 
burden of crime due to more lethal violence and more burglaries.  They note, however, 
that if the ruling is understood as providing people an entitlement to own handguns for 
self-defense, then from that starting point it is plausible that the "ban on bans" is justified, 
but so are reasonable restrictions that raise the price of handguns. 
 
These two papers are both about "regulation through litigation."  The MSA imposed 
regulation through litigation; the Heller decision limited it.  Both papers are also critical 
of the phenomenon, primarily on grounds that judicial intervention in matters that have 
been traditionally the province of the legislature constitutes an end-run around the 
political process.  However, as both papers acknowledge, evaluating such end-runs in 
general is difficult.  To do so would require a political economy model that considered 
the extent to (and circumstances under) which the judiciary should be allowed more or 
less latitude to limit regulation than to impose it; this is an important topic for future 
research.    
 
The contributions of Tomas Philipson, Eric Sun, and Dana Goldman and of Adam Gailey 
and Seth Seabury address another general issue in the study of regulation versus 
litigation:  whether duplicative control by regulation and litigation leads to advantages 
over and above those that could be obtained with either system alone. 
 
Philipson, Goldman, and Sun conclude that the answer to this question in the realm of 
prescription drug safety is no.  In the US, drug safety is governed jointly by the Food and 
Drug Administration, which oversees premarket clinical trials, and the liability system, 
which allows patients to sue manufacturers for injuries.  They examine the adoption of 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which sharply reduced vaccine 
manufacturers' liability in 1988.  They find that the Program reduced vaccine prices 
without affecting vaccine safety, consistent with the hypothesis that duplicative control 
by regulation and litigation is inefficient. 
 
Gailey and Seabury conclude that the answer to this question in the realm of workplace 
safety is yes.  They examine how workers' compensation rules affect the impact of 
employment protection statutes on the labor market outcomes of the disabled.  They 
estimate whether statutorily-required "reasonable accommodation" of workers' 
disabilities reduce the workers' compensation costs of workers who become disabled due 
to a workplace injury.  Put another way, they test whether the costs of the litigation-based system of protection from workplace discrimination might be at least partially offset by 
savings in the regulation-based workers' compensation system. 
 
Based on their analysis of March Current Population Surveys from 1996 to 2007, they 
find that the interaction between workplace discrimination law and workers' 
compensation leads to lower costs than would be expected from the two mechanisms 
considered independently.  Changes to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act 
that required greater accommodations of workers' disabilities led to increased rates of 
employment for workers' compensation recipients as compared to other disabled workers. 
 
Alison Morantz examines the performance of the workers' compensation system more 
generally.  Her paper shows how a regulatory system can become more litigious than the 
litigation system itself.  The "great compromise" of worker's compensation, whereby 
workers relinquished the right to use their employers for negligence in exchange for no-
fault compensation for occupational injuries, was one of the great triumphs of regulation 
over litigation in the twentieth century.  As Morantz observes, with the joint support of 
workers and employers, every state adopted a workers' compensation law between 1910 
and 1948.  Today, participation in the workers' compensation system is required in most 
states.   
 
Yet in recent years, the workers' compensation system has been criticized for becoming 
increasingly like the litigation system it was originally intended to replace.   In response, 
some large employers in the state of Texas – the only state that has preserved an elective 
statutory scheme – have begun opting out of the workers' compensation system and 
permitting their employees to sue them for workplace injuries in tort.   
 
Based on a unique survey of large, multistate "nonsubscribers" to Texas workers' 
compensation, Morantz documents the remarkable turnabout in the system’s appeal to 
large firms since its inception almost 100 years ago.  Although workers' compensation 
may have once offered the advantages of regulation, from the perspective of most 
surveyed corporations, it now suffers from many of the shortcomings of litigation.  
According to Morantz, Texas nonsubscribers reported that opting into the tort system 
reduced costs, litigation, delays in claim reporting, and delays in employees' return to 
work relative to workers' compensation.  She also reports several additional interesting 
findings.  Virtually all surveyed nonsubscribers compensated injured employees, 
regardless of fault, for occupational injuries.  Unlike workers' compensation, however, 
most of these "home-grown" occupational-injury plans did not impose any maximum 
weekly dollar amount or waiting period on the receipt of wage replacement benefits.  On 
the other hand, such plans typically imposed stricter reporting guidelines, capped total 
benefits, allowed the employer to direct medical treatment, and excluded payouts for 
permanently-disabling injuries. Most surveyed firms also sought to limit their tort 
exposure by resolving disputes through mandatory arbitration. 
 
The contributions of John Coates, Stephen Parente, and Tom Chang and Mireille 
Jacobson investigate the relative advantages of regulation and litigation in settings that 
have been previously unexamined.  John Coates compares the law governing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the United States and the United Kingdom.  One dimension of 
M&A law is the treatment of "break fees" -- payments that the target of a merger offer 
agrees to make to a prospective acquirer in the target is ultimately acquired by someone 
else.  Break fees have two competing effects on shareholders' interests:  although they 
may encourage prospective bidders to participate in an auction, they may also enable 
managers to favor bidders who will enrich the managers at shareholders' expense.  Break 
fees are routinely restricted as part of the corporate law doctrines of the US and the UK.  
In the US, courts review break fees in ex post litigation applying a general common-law 
standard of fiduciary duty; the UK caps such fees with a bright-line rule set by a 
regulatory body.   
 
Based on his analysis of 2,579 bids for US and UK corporations from 1989-2008, Coates 
finds that the break fees are statistically significantly lower in the UK than in the US.  In 
addition, he finds that the number of deals with competing bids is higher in the UK, and 
the number of completed bids is lower.  Although he cautions against drawing any 
welfare conclusions, his results suggest that a regulatory approach to M&A has at least 
some gross (if not necessarily net) social benefits, in the form of stronger competition for 
targets conditional on an M&A bid, but may come at the cost of reduced M&A activity. 
 
Steve Parente evaluates the performance of a new regulatory mechanism to detect 
prescription drug misuse.  As he and many others have pointed out, prescription drug 
misuse generates large negative externalities.  Most efforts at controlling misuse, 
however, are based on ex post approaches implemented by generalized law enforcement 
agencies.  Parente proposes a medical-claims-based algorithm that compares a 
prospective drug purchaser's observable characteristics to those that have been 
historically associated with misuse.  He finds that several commonly-observable 
characteristics are significant predictors of misuse.  He concludes with a discussion of 
how point-of-service fraud detection and intervention systems used by banks and credit 
card vendors could be adapted to this setting. 
 
Tom Chang and Mireille Jacobson examine the use of a cap-and-trade mechanism to 
regulation hospitals' provision of essential services.  They study California's mandate that 
all general acute care hospitals retrofit or rebuild in order to maintain their structural 
soundness after an earthquake.  They demonstrate that the mandate has important 
unintended consequences for the availability of hospital services and the provision of 
charity care.  They propose an alternative regulatory mechanism:  a system in which each 
California hospital would be required to provide a given number of earthquake-safe beds, 
but then be allowed to pay a neighboring hospital to satisfy their requirement.  They show 
that this cap-and-trade system could achieve the goal of insuring a minimum number of 








Coase, Ronald (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, 
3:1-44. 
 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Richard Posner (1974), "An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking," Journal of Legal Studies 3: 257-86. 
 
Dewees, Don, David Duff, and Michael Trebilcock (1996), Exploring the Domain of 
Accident Law:  Taking the Facts Seriously, Oxford University Press.  
 
Graham, John D. (1991), "Product Liability and Motor Vehicle Safety," in The Liability 
Maze, The Brookings Institution, pp. 120-190. 
 
Huber, Peter W. and Robert E. Litan, eds. (1991), The Liability Maze, The Brookings 
Institution. 
Kessler, Daniel P. and Mark B. McClellan (1996), "Do Doctors Practice Defensive 
Medicine?" Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 353-390. 
Moriss, Andrew P., Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak (2009), Regulation by 
Litigation, Yale University Press.  
 
Priest, George L. and Bernard Klein (1984), "The Selection of Disputes for Litigation," 
Journal of Legal Studies 13:1-55. 
 
Litan, Robert E. and Clifford Winston, eds. (1988), Liability:  Perspectives and Policy, 
The Brookings Institution. 
 
Shavell, Steven (1984a), Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, Journal of 
Legal Studies 13: 357-74. 
 
Shavell, Steven (1984b), A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 
RAND Journal of Economics 15: 271-80. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, ed. (2002), Regulation Through Litigation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies. 
 
Weiler, Paul C. et al. (1993), A Measure of Malpractice:  Medical Injury, Malpractice 
Litigation, and Patient Compensation, Harvard University Press. 
 
Wittman, Donald (1977), Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability:  The Choice Between 
Input and Output Monitoring, Journal of Legal Studies 6: 193-211. 
 